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Enhancing Fed Credibility 
 
Good afternoon.  It’s always a pleasure to speak to the members of NABE, and I very 
much appreciate the invitation to participate in this year’s Economic Policy Conference.   
My remarks today will focus on the issue of credibility—in particular on the Federal 
Reserve’s credibility regarding its announced commitment to maintaining price stability.  I will 
discuss ways in which the Federal Reserve could improve transparency and communication, 
enhancing Fed credibility and the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
To my mind, credibility is a worthy end in itself—those who are credible are often said to 
be “as good as their word.”  But credibility is not only virtuous; it is also useful.  I will argue that 
one of its most important benefits is shaping public expectations about inflation, and in 
particular, “anchoring” those expectations to price stability.  As a consequence, credibility 
enhances the effectiveness of monetary policy which, in turn, serves a second “worthy end”, 
namely, maximizing the nation’s economic well-being.     
To give you a brief overview of the argument, the idea is that, with credibility, the Fed 
and the public work together toward the same goals.  When this happens, one often hears the 
phrase “the markets do all the work of monetary policy,” meaning that market participants 
correctly anticipate the actions that the Fed will make in response to economic news and shocks.  
This alignment of the Fed’s actions and the public’s expectations strengthens the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism and shortens policy lags.   In contrast, in the absence of  
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credibility, policymakers and the public may work at cross-purposes, and monetary policy must 
act to overcome and dislodge expectations that hinder the achievement of our goals.  Indeed, as I 
will discuss more fully in a few minutes, this is exactly what happened in the 1970s in the United 
States. 
Credibility is all about what the public expects the Fed will do in the future.  Indeed, 
macroeconomic theory teaches us that expectations of future economic developments play a 
prominent role in all aspects of economic decision-making.  For example, consumption theory 
tells us that consumer spending depends on one’s permanent income, that is, the present value of 
expected future income.  Similarly, bond yields depend on expected future short-term interest 
rates.  The list goes on and on.  Of critical importance for the successful conduct of monetary 
policy, economic theory tells us that prices set today depend on the inflation rate expected in the 
future.  Therefore, it is only when the Fed’s commitment to low inflation is credible that people 
will expect low inflation in the future and set prices accordingly.  Clearly, then, expectations of 
future inflation play a central role in our analysis of the economy and in our policy deliberations. 
  We have certainly seen the grim consequences when the Fed’s commitment to low 
inflation is not credible.  Let me step briefly back in time to remind you.  In the 1950s and early 
1960s the Fed had accumulated an enviable track record of maintaining price stability—for 
example, the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price inflation rate averaged a little more 
than 1-1/2 percent from 1955 to 1965.
1  But, starting in the late 1960s, the grip on inflation had 
begun to slip.  By1970, the core measure of PCE price inflation roughly tripled to over 4-1/2 
percent; and then between 1970 and 1980, it doubled to over 9 percent.  Not surprisingly, by 
1980, the public had little faith in the Fed’s commitment to price stability, and in that year, 
expectations of inflation for the next 10 years reached 8 percent.   The economy had entered a  
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wage-price-expectations spiral where higher inflation fed into higher wage demands and higher 
expected inflation, which fed back into higher inflation.  Worse yet, high inflation occurred at the 
same time as high unemployment: stagflation had set in.  
To be sure, the 1970s were a challenging period for monetary policy.   Sizable negative 
supply shocks, including the oil price shocks and the productivity slowdown, created difficult 
short-run tradeoffs between the Fed’s dual goals—maximum sustainable employment and price 
stability.  But monetary policy decisions at the time also greatly exacerbated these problems. 
Research suggests that the dismal macroeconomic record of the 1970s could have been 
significantly improved if the Fed had “taken ownership” of the inflation situation—that is, if it 
had paid close and consistent attention to keeping inflation contained.  By doing so, it would 
have done a better job of anchoring expectations to low inflation.  For example, one study 
analyzed the effects of supply shocks when the Fed has imperfect credibility and the public 
continuously reevaluates its perception of Fed policy based on what occurs in the economy.
2   It 
showed that a sustained rise in inflation combined with accommodative monetary policy, like the 
one that occurred during the late 1960s and much of the 1970s, impels a process that undermines 
the public’s confidence in the Fed’s commitment to low inflation.  In other words, these 
developments eventually erode the cable tethering expectations to price stability as people come 
to believe that the prevailing high inflation rate will persist into the indefinite future, just as 
occurred in the 1970s.  If, instead, the Fed responds enough to stem the rise in inflation, inflation 
expectations remain well anchored to price stability.  This research suggests that if the Fed had 
followed such a policy during the 1970s, even in the face of those severe supply shocks, the 
result would have been lower and much more stable inflation and unemployment, which, in turn, 
would have obviated the need for the painful disinflationary recessions of the early 1980s.    
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This research also suggests another very important benefit of central bank credibility—
that is, of monetary policy that successfully anchors expectations to price stability.  Such a policy 
can improve the achievement of both parts of the Fed’s dual mandate: maximum sustainable 
employment and price stability.  When the public is confident in the Fed’s commitment to price 
stability, the Fed has more latitude to respond to fluctuations in labor and product markets, 
because there is less risk that an easing of policy will unleash a wave of inflation fears.
3   
Fortunately, the Fed’s commitment to price stability has indeed become far more credible 
since the 1970s, so I can illustrate this point based on some recent experience.  In 2001, the Fed 
was able to cut rates aggressively in response to the recession, confident that inflation 
expectations would remain low.  Similarly, over the past two years, wages, core inflation, and 
long-run inflation expectations have remained well contained despite a dramatic increase in 
energy prices.  With inflation expectations under control, we have avoided a rehash of the 1970s 
and the need to rein in inflation by engineering a severe recession. 
How has the Fed built this credibility?  As I said at the outset, the Fed, like other central 
banks, has earned its credibility:  It has a long track record of delivering low and stable inflation.  
But digging deeper into the process, I’d like to focus on two aspects of policy—one having to do 
with policy actions and the other with the words that support those actions—that have changed 
dramatically since the 1970s and that have contributed to this admirable track record.   
First, in terms of policy actions, the Fed has become more systematic in its approach to 
maintaining price stability and promoting maximum sustainable employment.  This systematic 
approach is well-described by the famous “Taylor Rule” (John Taylor, 1993).  According to the 
Taylor Rule, an increase in inflation should consistently call forth a tighter monetary policy in 
the form of a higher real federal funds rate.  In addition, the Fed should systematically tighten  
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policy as labor market slack diminishes.  Such a response serves to stabilize output and 
employment and also to preempt an increase in inflation.  The experience of 1994 exemplifies 
the application of these principles: faced with declining unemployment and the prospect of an 
unwelcome increase in inflation, the Fed engineered a strong funds rate response.  Because the 
Fed has been consistent in its approach, over time, market participants have come to observe its 
reaction to news and therefore better understand the determinants of policy.  Therefore, this 
approach has enhanced the ability of financial markets to anticipate the policy response to 
economic developments. 
Second, the Fed has taken a number of steps to improve the public’s understanding of its 
policy decisions through an increased emphasis on communication and transparency.  In early 
1994, just twelve years ago, the FOMC first started to announce explicitly changes in the federal 
funds rate target in the post-meeting press release.  Later that year, it added descriptions of the 
state of the economy and the rationale for the policy action to the release.  In 2000, the FOMC 
introduced a statement describing the “balance of risks” to the outlook, and in 2002 the 
Committee began releasing the votes of its individual members and the preferred policy choices 
of any dissenters. In 2003, the FOMC first gave forward-looking guidance on policy in the post-
meeting release, stating “that policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable 
period.”   Finally, last year, it decided to release the minutes of its meetings with a much shorter 
delay—only three weeks, as opposed to just after the subsequent meeting.  This shorter time 
horizon provides the public with a more timely and nuanced understanding of the various views 
within the Committee. 
This enhanced transparency complements the systematic approach because it, too, helps 
the markets anticipate the Fed's response to economic developments.  Recent research highlights  
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the ways in which central bank communication can improve the public’s ability to predict policy 
actions, and how this improvement can enhance the effectiveness of policy at stabilizing the 
economy.
4  The key insight of this research is that the central bank has useful knowledge about 
the likely direction of the economy and monetary policy that the public does not have.  
Conveying this information to the public better aligns private and central bank expectations 
about policy and the economy.  And this appears to be working in practice: financial markets 
have become much better at forecasting the future path of monetary policy than they were up to 
the late 1980s, and are more certain of their forecast ex ante, as measured by implied volatilities 
from options contracts.
5 
Enhanced transparency is particularly valuable when policy has to deviate from its 
normal, systematic approach. A good illustration comes from 2003, when inflation fell below a 
comfortable level and there was a threat of outright deflation.  In post-FOMC meeting statements 
issued that year, the FOMC referred to “…an unwelcome fall in inflation…” and worried about 
“…the risk of inflation becoming undesirably low…” Consistent with the findings of economic 
research, it made sense for the FOMC to take a more accommodative stance than otherwise 
would be expected until this threat had passed.
6  For this policy strategy to work, it required that 
the public understand it and correctly foresee that policy would remain accommodative for some 
time. Again, it is the public’s expectation of future actions, not just the current setting of the fed 
funds rate, that matters for bond rates, inflation expectations, and other economic variables. 
Therefore, the FOMC statement at that time said, "In these circumstances, the Committee 
believes that policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period." This forward-
looking language itself seems to have helped keep long-term interest rates low, which added 
stimulus to the economy and helped avoid deflation.  
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I believe these two features of Fed monetary policy—a systematic approach to policy and 
the steps towards more open communication and transparency—are particularly noteworthy in 
contributing to our policy success over the past two decades. They have helped strengthen public 
confidence in the Fed and thereby helped anchor inflation expectations to price stability.  
Additionally, by providing clear explanations of its policies to the public, greater transparency 
has also enhanced Fed accountability, a vital consideration for a government institution in a 
democracy. 
But, despite the many steps that we have made on communication and transparency, 
other central banks have gone further than the Fed.  Indeed, a growing number of “inflation 
targeting” central banks explicitly state a numerical objective for the inflation rate and provide 
reports detailing their economic forecasts.
7  There has been a great deal of discussion of whether 
the Federal Reserve should likewise take further steps towards more open communication, 
including publicly announcing a specific, numerical inflation objective.  I will spend the 
remainder of my remarks addressing this question, looking first to the results from theoretical 
and empirical research on the effects of such communication.  
First, what are the benefits of adopting a numerical objective for inflation?  In theory, 
effective central bank communication of a numerical long-run inflation objective to the public 
can simplify the complicated informational problems people face in the economy, and can reduce 
the uncertainty about the central bank’s goals and policies.  Indeed, recent research suggests that 
clear communication of a numerical long-run inflation objective may assist in the anchoring of 
long-run inflation expectations, relative to a policy that leaves it to the public to infer the 
objective from experience.
8  The resulting improved alignment of Fed actions and public 
perceptions would reduce expectations errors that would otherwise add to macroeconomic  
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variability.  As a result, the Fed would be better able to achieve both inflation and employment 
goals.  In the parlance of economists, communication of a numerical long-run inflation objective 
could shift inward the “macroeconomic possibilities frontier”—the economy’s menu of feasible 
output and inflation volatility combinations.   Of course, for communication to be effective, 
policymakers must consistently take appropriate actions that back up the commitment to price 
stability and full employment.   
Another important reason to provide clear guidance to the public regarding the long-run 
inflation objective is that doing so may help us avoid deflation and reduce the costs of its 
occurrence. We have long known that inflation can be too high, but the recent experience of 
Japan has reminded us that inflation can be too low as well. We know from history that such an 
outcome can be extremely damaging to the economy.  Perhaps the most unsettling aspect of the 
experience of Japan over the past decade is how difficult it can be to extract oneself from 
deflation.  An explicit numerical long-run inflation objective may help anchor inflation 
expectations at a low positive number and avoid a potentially devastating deflationary spiral. 
What is the empirical evidence on the value of an explicit numerical inflation objective?  
So far, it has been hard to find convincing evidence that countries with an announced numerical 
inflation objective have performed better in terms of inflation and macroeconomic stabilization 
than those that do not have one.  Part of the problem is that there just aren’t enough 
macroeconomic data to get a clear read on this question.
9  But we do have data on inflation 
expectations that provide evidence about the effect of communication on anchoring expectations, 
which is the key mechanism that improves macro performance in the theoretical research I’ve 
discussed. 
Surveys of long-run inflation expectations have been remarkably stable in both the 
United States and in inflation-targeting countries over the past ten years.  Indeed, based on the 
evidence from survey data, it’s hard to argue that inflation expectations are not pretty well  
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anchored already.
10 An extreme example is provided by the Survey of Professional Forecasters; 
its median forecast of inflation over the next ten years has barely budged from 2.5 percent over 
the past 6 years, despite large fluctuations in energy prices and other disturbances. 
But, the evidence on the stability of long-run inflation expectations in the United States 
derived from financial markets is not quite so reassuring.  Researchers using measures of 
inflation expectations derived from bond market data find that long-run inflation expectations in 
inflation-targeting countries are remarkably stable and well-anchored, while in the United States 
long-run inflation expectations have been highly sensitive to economic news.
11  These studies 
examine far-ahead forward inflation compensation—the difference between far-ahead forward 
interest rates on nominal and inflation-indexed bonds—to measure long-term inflation 
expectations.  Although this measure of long-term inflation “compensation” is noisy and by no 
means perfect, the extent to which it moves in response to major economic news—such as 
economic data releases and monetary policy announcements—nonetheless sheds light on the 
stability of long-term inflation expectations in a given country.  Thus, if ten-year-ahead forward 
inflation compensation does not respond significantly or systematically to major economic news, 
then that suggests that financial market participants have relatively well-anchored views about 
the long-term outlook for inflation in that country. 
For the United States, they find that far-ahead forward inflation compensation has 
exhibited significant, systematic responses to macroeconomic data releases and monetary policy 
announcements.  These responses suggest that developments that affect the near-term outlook for 
the economy also pass through to expectations of inflation at much longer horizons.  However, in 
countries with explicit numerical inflation objectives, including Canada and Sweden, the 
research finds that long-term inflation compensation has been unresponsive to economic news.  
Although the evidence from surveys and financial markets is admittedly mixed, taken together 
these studies suggest that announcing a numerical price stability objective and greater 
transparency in general could help further anchor long-run inflation expectations.    
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My personal view is that the steps that we have already taken toward greater transparency 
have been a good thing, and that we should think seriously about venturing further along this 
path.  As Mae West famously said, “Too much of a good thing can be wonderful.”  More 
seriously, although it is possible to carry transparency too far—I would not, for example, want 
live television coverage of FOMC meetings—I support the idea of a quantitative objective for 
price stability.  I believe that it enhances both Fed transparency and accountability and that it 
offers important benefits, as I have discussed.  In particular, it could help to anchor the public's 
long-term inflation expectations from being pushed too far up or down, and thus help avoid both 
destabilizing inflation scares and deflations; a credible inflation objective could thereby enhance 
the flexibility of monetary policy to respond to the real effects of adverse shocks.   
A numerical definition of price stability could also help to focus and clarify our own 
analysis and discussions in the FOMC.  For example, the Board staff regularly prepares detailed 
forecasts and analyses of monetary policy options.  But, this otherwise quite sophisticated 
analysis is hampered by the lack of clear guidance as to what exactly the long-run inflation 
objective is.
12  In particular, it is difficult to derive and analyze the appropriate path for policy 
when one does not know what the policy goal is.  Similarly, I think the discussion of risks to 
price stability at the policy table would gain a sharper focus if we had a numerical price stability 
objective.   
Indeed, articulating an explicit numerical long-run inflation objective may not be such a 
big step as some people imagine.  Many people have interpreted the FOMC statements in 2003 
that I mentioned before as signaling a lower bound for the amount of inflation the FOMC will 
accept and statements in other years placing an upper bound on acceptable inflation.  In addition, 
several FOMC members have already publicly referred to their comfort zones for inflation and  
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these have been repeated by the press and market analysts.   Therefore, such a declaration may 
serve to solidify and clarify what people already believe to be true. 
In my view, the choice of a specific inflation objective should depend, in part, on an 
evaluation of the costs and benefits of very low inflation.  The inflation objective should contain 
a buffer sufficient to make sure that the lower bound on the nominal interest rate does not 
interfere with the ability of monetary policy to stabilize the economy and that downward nominal 
wage rigidity does not interfere with overall labor market performance.  Factors such as the 
magnitude of the neutral real funds rate, the degree of macroeconomic volatility, and the pace of 
productivity growth, are relevant in assessing the size of the needed buffer.  Estimates of the 
extent of measurement bias in the relevant inflation indices must also figure into the choice of 
the numerical objective.
13 
The choices of a specific index, objective and range are matters on which judgments may 
differ.  Taking the various factors that I mentioned into account, I see an inflation rate of 1-1/2 
percent as measured by the core personal consumption expenditures price index, with a comfort 
zone extending between 1 and 2 percent, as an appropriate price stability objective for the Fed.  
In terms of setting a long-run goal, I think it makes sense to focus our public communication on 
one specific price index.  Doing so is simpler and more transparent than giving out multiple, 
potentially contradictory, objectives for different price indices.  Of course, the issue of the 
appropriate level of the long-run inflation objective should be occasionally revisited.  If the 
fundamental factors influencing this choice of a numerical inflation objective were to change 
significantly, the level of the objective should be revised accordingly.      
As with any change in procedure, there are potential drawbacks.  One is the possibility 
that some observers may misinterpret the enunciation of a long-run inflation objective as a down-
weighting of the Committee’s mandate to foster maximum employment. Moreover, there is an  
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actual risk that the Committee’s performance with respect to the employment goal could actually 
be compromised if too short a time-frame is allowed for the attainment of the price-stability 
objective.  To reduce the risk of such an outcome, the announcement of any numerical inflation 
objective should be made in the context of clear and effective communication of the Fed’s 
multiple goals. Here, I am drawn to some specific language proposed by Chairman Bernanke 
(2003) while he was a Fed Governor: “the FOMC regards this inflation rate as a long-run 
objective only and sets no fixed time frame for reaching it. In particular, in deciding how quickly 
to move toward the long-run inflation objective, the FOMC will always take into account the 
implications for near-term economic and financial stability.”  I concur that the numerical 
objective is a long-run goal, and would want the Committee to have a flexible timeframe within 
which to maintain it.  
But, you may ask: If the FOMC were to announce a numerical long-run price stability 
objective, why shouldn’t the Fed also announce a target for full employment, the other half of the 
dual mandate?  In fact, the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 –often referred 
to as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act-- did that, stipulating a 4 percent unemployment rate target, as 
well as a zero inflation target.  However, unlike the inflation rate, which is under the long-run 
control of the central bank, the Fed does not have the capacity to achieve any long-run 
unemployment objective that is not consistent with economic fundamentals.   
Of course, we do attempt to gauge the level of maximum sustainable employment in 
analyzing the economy and evaluating policy choices.  However, the two pieces of this puzzle, 
the natural rate of unemployment and trend labor force participation, change over time in 
unpredictable ways and are measured with considerable error.  In the spirit of clearer 
communication, I think it would be worthwhile to communicate more fully to the public our 
analysis and views on the economic outlook and estimates of sustainable employment, 
unemployment, and output.  But, raising these estimates to the level of a formal explicit  
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numerical long-run unemployment objective would be misguided and confusing, and could 
endanger our hard-won credibility.   
In addition to announcing a numerical price stability objective, I believe the Fed should 
continue to enhance its communications regarding the economic outlook and perspectives on 
monetary policy.  Other central banks have adopted a wide range of communications practices 
aimed at improving both transparency and accountability.  We should carefully study whether 
any of these might be suitable for the Federal Reserve to adopt.  Although policymakers may not 
see the future perfectly, we do know what we are thinking about in terms of policy, and we 
should convey that information to the public as best we can.  
In summary, the Fed has made significant progress in building credibility over the past 
two decades by following systematic and appropriate monetary policy and gradually increasing 
the quality of our communication and transparency.  I think it makes sense to take this 
transparency at least one step further by articulating a numerical price stability objective.  I 
recognize that there are potential costs to doing so, but to my mind, they are outweighed by the 
benefits. Such a step could further enhance the credibility of the Fed and improve the 
effectiveness of monetary policy not only for controlling inflation but also for stabilizing 
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